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SOUND AND MUSIC PRODUCTION
MARK GRIMSHAW
A brief argument for, and summa ry 
of, the concept of Sonic Virtuality1
Introduction
When that august body, the Acoustical Society of America, publishes a defi nition of 
sound in the American National Standards bible on Acoustical Terminology, and an in-
nocent question on the wording of that defi nition to an acoustics-based colleague of 
mine provokes a negative response – “[the] defi nition [is] out of scope for most of 
the purposes I know [the defi nition] is only operational for some purposes [...] It is 
there fore necessary to use domain-specifi c defi nitions”2 – then there is clearly some-
thing quite wrong. In extremis, one might reasonably ask, if there is no agreement as 
to what sound is even among acousticians, is the entire scientifi c basis for the study of 
acoustics fundamentally fl awed?3
As this essay makes clear in its opening sections, there historically have been and 
currently are several defi nitions of sound and so among the fi rst aims of the essay 
are to enumerate some of the most important defi nitions, to tease out differences 
 between them, and to highlight inconsistencies both with each defi nition and in the 
context of our experiences, physically and phenomenologically, of what sound is.
What is the purpose of such an initially hermeneutic approach? It is precisely this: 
to argue for a defi nition of sound (and its underlying concepts) that is more consist-
ent with recent research and thinking, that is more consistent with our phenomeno-
logical experience, and that has more use-value in the context of new technological 
developments. On this last point, my interest has been sparked by research collabo-
ration with colleagues in the fi eld of computer game sound. In particular, our work 
with biofeedback has, for our thinking about sound, its effects, and how to design af-
fective sound, inspired and clearly necessitated the need for a new defi nition of what 
1 In a 2015 book, my co-author Tom Garner and I put forward an alternate defi nition and concept of 
sound (M. Grimshaw and T. Garner, Sonic Virtuality: Sound as Emergent Perception, (New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 2015)) that was in opposition not only to the standard view of sound (the one 
used in acoustics) but that also opposed other more philosophical defi nitions that have appeared 
over the last decade or so. I presented a brief presentation of the book and its ideas to the Musik og 
lyd konference in early 2015 and what follows is an expansion of that paper and so a summary of 
some of the major points of Sonic Virtuality.
2 Personal email communication, 1st September 2015.
3 Probably not. But, as I explain in this essay, acousticians are misguided concerning what they study. 
Thinking that what they study is sound, they are in fact studying sound waves.
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sound is.4 What becomes clear from this research (and other research investigating re-
sponses to audio) is the highly individualistic sound we experience – the phenomenon of 
sound is context-specifi c where that context includes the perceiver’s brain and the wider 
environment. Rather than attempt to use statistical methods and rationales to smooth 
over such differences in order to produce a generalized, mass-produced, one-size-fi ts-all 
audio artefact (for computer games and elsewhere), I prefer the approach of sound de-
sign that celebrates and utilizes these personal differences because this, I believe, increas-
es our engagement with computer games (and other multimodal artefacts), increases the 
possibility of enhanced presence in virtual environments, and leads to new sound design 
archetypes. Most importantly, though, such an approach, and the results deriving from it, 
gets us closer to what sound is as the object of design and as the object of study; in order 
to design sound, one must fi rst know what it is. Hence the defi nition offered here.
I begin the essay proper by enumerating various current defi nitions of sound and 
discussing a number of identifi ed problems with them. The fi rst section deals with 
what is termed the standard defi nition of sound in the western world (there are actu-
ally several of these ‘standard’ defi nitions) and the inconsistent and incoherent uses 
to which this defi nition is put. Following this, I present some other defi nitions that 
are philosophical and, towards the end of the section, are more phenomenological. In 
this second section, I also present a short discussion of everyday listening. I then move 
onto a presentation of the new defi nition and a brief outline of the concept of sonic 
virtuality before closing with some speculative thoughts on the defi nition’s and con-
cept’s use and implementation by sound designers.
The standard view of sound
The multiplicity of physics-based defi nitions
Whenever I ask my students what is sound?, beyond regular and frequent answers such 
as noise, music, or speech, almost invariably I am told that sound is a sound wave. This 
defi nition (or a variation of it) is probably the answer many of the readers of this ar-
ticle would provide because it is the standard Western defi nition as found in phys-
ics and specifi cally acoustics. The 10th edition of The Concise Oxford English Diction-
ary provides the following primary defi nition of the noun: “vibrations which travel 
through the air or another medium and are sensed by the ear.” A fuller defi nition, 
in which I attempt to be more precise by dint of the use of jargon, may be stated as: 
sound is a pressure wave moving through a medium and whose properties of direction of trav-
el, frequency, and amplitude lie within the sensory range of an auditory system.
The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) provides two (possibly three) 
defi nitions of sound to be used depending upon the context in which sound is to be 
4 Biofeedback in this context involves the use and interpretation of data from psychophysiological de-
vices such as electroencephalographic headsets for the real-time processing or synthesis of audio for 
the purposes of close control of arousal and emotions during computer gameplay. As an example: in 
a survival horror game, the game engine will sense that you are not scared enough and will immedi-
ately respond with more scary sounds.
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5 American National Standard, Acoustical Terminology. ANSI/ASA S1.1-2013
6 This defi nition has the following note appended: “Not all sounds evoke an auditory sensation, e.g., 
ultrasound or infrasound. Not all auditory sensations are evoked by sound, e.g., tinnitus.” From part 
b) of the defi nition, sound is defi ned as an auditory sensation; what the note is clarifying [sic], then, 
is: “Not all sounds evoke a sound [...] Not all sounds are evoked by sound.” I suspect the reader may 
be as puzzled as I am by such claims while secretly applauding such pataphysical dadaism from the 
normally po-faced fi eld of acoustics.
7 D. Pouliot, Hearing Without Ears (Auditory Brainstem Implant). Accessed August 25, 2015, http://lobe.
ca/en/non-classee/hearing-without-ears-auditory-brainstem-implant/#.VdQuvbfGam4. 
8 On one page alone, the following statements occur: “It is the motion imparted to this, the auditory 
 nerve, which, in the brain, is translated into sound” and, discussing exploding gases in a lecture thea-
tre, “every ear in this room is conscious of a shock, to which the name of sound is given”. On a later 
page, the following appear: using the analogy of balls in a row hitting against each other (thus the mo-
tion of the fi rst ball is transferred to the last), Tyndall states that “thus is sound conveyed from particle 
to particle through the air” and yet, when describing how this motion sets the tympanic membrane 
vibrating, which motion is itself transmitted along the auditory nerve to the brain, it is in the brain 
that “the vibrations are translated into sound”. Tyndall’s book was written four years after, and is heav-
ily indebted to, von Helmholtz’s Die Lehre von den Tonempfi ndungen, a work of some signifi cance in the 
canon of modern acoustics. J. Tyndall, On Sound, (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1867), 2-4.
9 R. Pasnau, “What is Sound?” The Philosophical Quarterly 49:196 (1999): 318-319.
10 D. M. Howard and J. Angus, Acoustics and Psychoacoustics, (Oxford: Focal Press, 1996), 1.
used or studied. Sound is either “(a) Oscillation in pressure, stress, particle displace-
ment, particle velocity, etc., propagated in a medium with internal forces (e.g., elastic 
or viscous), or the superposition of such propagated oscillation” or the “(b) Auditory 
sensation evoked by the oscillation described in (a).”5 Sound is thus, and variously, an 
oscillation in any of an unstated number of physical properties, the superposition of 
such oscillations (and one must assume the plural here), or the auditory sensation of 
this oscillation (presumably also the sensation of superpositions of such oscillations).6
In a popular article describing the process of an auditory brainstem implant, there 
appears this statement: “the area where the axons (nerve fi bres) and cochlear nucleus 
(synapses)—which transport sounds picked up by the ear to the cerebral cortex—are 
found”.7 In this case, sound appears (in similar manner to the two ANSI defi nitions) 
to exist simultaneously in two states: the vibrations to be picked up by the ear and 
the auditory sensation of such vibrations. Such ambiguity, vagueness, and imprecision 
(perhaps surprising to those expecting the claimed-for exactitude, rigour, and preci-
sion of the natural sciences) can also be found in scholarly textbooks and academic 
articles on acoustics and psychoacoustics as Pasnau makes clear when he enumerates 
several examples that, taken together, bring into focus the incoherency of the standard 
physics-based defi nitions of sound. For instance, in the same 19th century acoustics 
textbook by John Tyndall, sound is located within the brain, within the sound source, 
or is to be found moving within the medium8 while, in a modern handbook dealing 
with the perception and cognition of hearing, sound is described both as a compres-
sion wave and as the sound source itself.9 Finally, an acoustics textbook I have long 
used for teaching (and from which I myself was taught) describes sound as “a me-
chanical disturbance of the medium”.10 While the authors admit that it is a simplistic 
defi nition, it is nevertheless the one provided on the opening page of this standard 
textbook and there are so many fl aws with it that it is diffi cult to know where to begin.
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Problems with these defi nitions
As there are rather many defi nitions of sound as a physical phenomenon, to avoid 
confusion I shall group them together under what Pasnau terms the standard view of 
sound.11 For Pasnau, this term brackets together two common concepts found with-
in all these defi nitions. First, as Aristotle fi rst identifi ed, that sound is the object of 
 hearing and, second, that sound exists in the medium (for humans, typically air) and 
thus sound in the standard view, however the defi nition is formed, is the object of our 
 hearing and this object consists of vibrations or oscillations in a medium. The sec-
ond defi nition provided by ANSI – that sound is an auditory sensation – complicates 
matters as it might be said to reference Aristotle’s statement on sound but it does not 
directly reference the second common concept that Pasnau identifi es. It is, however, 
best viewed not as a physics-based defi nition but as a psychology-based defi nition. 
Nevertheless, psycho acoustics both uses this defi nition and relies for it on the pres-
ence of sound waves.
There are two fundamental categories of problems with the quite singular standard 
view of sound. First is the issue of the language and the words used in the defi nitions 
bracketed under that view. Second is the quite limited usefulness of such defi nitions.
First, the wording. In the OED defi nition, which or whose ear does the sensing of 
the vibrations? Human ears only or those of other animals, birds, and insects? What 
precisely is an ear – is that of reptiles, such as snakes, properly termed an ear when it 
comprises only what may be described (in human terms) as the inner ear? What of the 
case of auditory brainstem implants where the useless ear (or auditory nerve) is by-
passed with a microphone – do the recipients of such implants sense sound without 
the use of ears? What of tinnitus – particularly subjective forms such as the high-pitched 
ringing experienced by many – where are the vibrations or oscillations in a medium?
If such tinnitus sufferers do indeed hear sound, then the defi nitions provided by 
ANSI can be discarded out of hand. Even my attempt to use jargon to more accurately 
defi ne sound while remaining true to the standard view fails when one asks two sim-
ple questions: what precisely is the auditory system and what is the frequency range of 
hearing?12 Across hearing species, there are widely varying hearing frequency ranges. If 
sound is indeed a pressure wave/vibrations/oscillations in a medium that can be sensed 
by the ear/auditory system, then, as a thought experiment, if both a human and a dog 
are subject at the same time to the same sound wave at 30kHz, why should it only be 
defi ned as sound for the one simply because the other’s auditory sensory apparatus can-
not sense it? And what of infrasound that can be felt through the skin – is the auditory 
system simply part of our tactile sense because, as one famous (and famously profound-
ly deaf) musician has suggested, “hearing is basically a specialized form of touch”?13
Related to this problem of the wording is the use made of the defi nitions because 
the use that sound as a defi nition is put to depends to a large extent on the fi rmness 
(or not) of the wording (although defi nitions can be blithely disregarded as is the 
11 Pasnau. “What is Sound?” 309-310.
12 A good human hearing range is typically quoted as between 20Hz and 20kHz.
13 E. Glennie, Hearing Essay, (1993). Accessed August 19, 2015, https://www.evelyn.co.uk/hearing- essay/.
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14 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G-lN8vWm3m0
case previously noted with Tyndall happily defi ning sound as a motion propagated 
through air while at the same time stating that sound exists in the brain). If one can-
not agree on one rigorous defi nition of sound, then how does one know precisely 
what the object of study is (let alone hearing) or, indeed, if two articles purporting to 
deal with sound are, in fact, dealing with that same object of study or hearing?
The second category of problems is, for me, the more egregious and the reason why 
I have spent some time devising what I believe to be a more precise, comprehensive, 
and useful defi nition of sound: the standard view of sound is too limited in its scope; 
it does not match the reality of our experience and thus is too limited in its use- value. 
My objection is founded upon two disparate frameworks of knowledge that might 
 broadly be defi ned as objective and subjective. The physics-based defi nition attempts 
to be objective because industrialization requires standardization and mass production 
and so two people subject to the same sound wave at the same time and at the same 
location will (must), according to such defi nitions, hear the same sound. Similarly, as-
suming all things technological are equal, the same audio data played back at different 
times will (must) produce the same sound waves particularly if that audio data is in 
digital format. This, at least, is the theory; endlessly reproducible sonic artefacts, identi-
cal copies of some original, and all neatly packaged for the digital consumer.
The reality of our experience is somewhat and frequently different and this, I be-
lieve, is where the standard view of sound fails. Two simple and easily accessible 
demonstrations will suffi ce to show this. The fi rst is the well-known McGurk Effect 
( numerous examples of which can be found on the Internet including one produced 
by the BBC14). Briefl y, the syllable ‘baa’ is spoken, recorded, and played back over two 
videos, one in which the subject articulates ‘baa’ (from whence the syllable ‘baa’ is re-
corded) and the other in which the subject articulates ‘faa’ (the lip and tongue move-
ments are quite distinct between the two). Thus, the same audio data is reproduced 
multiple times and so, on the same equipment and settings and in the same loca-
tion, the same sound waves move through the air and so, according to the standard 
view of sound, the same sound is reproduced time and time again. If sound is the 
sound wave then the same sound should be heard at all times by all listeners or even 
the single listener. This does not happen. Instead, what is heard are the syllables ‘baa’ 
and ‘faa’ over the appropriate image as if two different sets of sound waves are being 
produced. If part of the standard view of sound is that sound is the object of our hear-
ing, it is interesting to note that listeners, when asked what they hear, report the two 
different sounds (i.e. the objects that they hear) despite the presence of only the one 
recorded sound wave. One must conclude either, that if sound really is a sound wave, 
then sound is not the object of our hearing or, that if sound really is the object of our 
hearing, then sound waves are not sound. Either way, the standard view of sound is as 
incoherent as Pasnau claims.
On the issue of the effects of cross-modality of hearing and vision (and other 
 senses) and how that issue affects our understanding of what sound is, I return to 
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this later. The second demonstration is what might be broadly termed mimicry if not 
outright trickery and it trades on ambiguity of the source and/or inexperience of the 
listener but, unlike the McGurk Effect, does not use other sensory modalities. There 
are two examples I present here both of which are easily testable. The fi rst is to play 
for a subject the recording of a Geiger counter. Anyone familiar with the characteris-
tic crackling sound will invariably give the correct answer upon being asked what the 
sound is but others will give different answers such as the preparation of popcorn. My 
favourite example, though, is the extraordinary mimicry of the Australian lyrebird that 
has a repertoire of sounds including camera shutter (replete with automatic winding 
motor), chainsaws, alarms, and sirens. Those not familiar with this creature and its 
ability to mimic such sounds will typically label the sounds as listed above (assuming 
familiarity with these objects) while those familiar with the widely available examples 
of the bird’s mimicry on the Internet will immediately label the sounds as the lyrebird.
In the above paragraph, the astute reader will have noticed a subtle shift in my use 
of language. It is a shift in the use of the word ‘sound’ that now equates it with the 
objects that (originally) produced the sound waves that were recorded for these two 
examples. This relates to our everyday experience of sound that, again, I return to later 
being content for now to state that this everyday defi nition of sound is not one that 
fi nds favour with the standard view of sound (in this everyday defi nition, sound is the 
sound wave source – logically, the sound produces the sound wave and so sound waves 
supervene upon sounds – sound waves, then, are how sounds are made manifest15).16
Other defi nitions of sound
It is not my intention to thoroughly detail or even list all defi nitions of sound both 
historical and current. Here, I present defi nitions that, in many respects, oppose the 
standard view of sound although some still rely on the presence of sound waves 
(which, in these defi nitions are not themselves sound); the defi nition encapsulat-
ed within sonic virtuality that I present later does not rely on this presence. For the 
reader wishing to peruse a fuller list of sound defi nitions, I refer them to Nudds and 
O’Callaghan and especially to Casati and Dokic.17 18 Those I present here are, I believe, 
15 R. Casati and J. Dokic, “Some Varieties of Spatial Hearing,” in Sounds & Perception, eds. M. Nudds 
and C. O’Callaghan, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 98-99.
16 Even those adhering to the standard view of sound fall prey to this equivalence between sound and 
sound source as Pasnau describes elsewhere in this article and as in this example from an acoustics 
textbook: “Trained singers [...] exhibit an effect known as ‘vibrato’ in which their fundamental fre-
quency is varied [...]” (Howard and Angus. Acoustics and Psychoacoustics. 193). Thus, the funda-
mental is a property of the singer and not a vibration in the medium of air. (I should state here that, 
while it can be fun, it is not my intention to attack such trivial and venial deviations from  scientifi c 
orthodoxy – I would quickly become a hostage to fortune myself were I to do so – but rather to 
demonstrate the yawning chasm and barely sustainable tension that exists between the standard 
view of sound and our everyday experience and understanding of sound.
17 M. Nudds and C. O’Callaghan, eds., Sounds & Perception, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
18 R. Casati and J. Dokic, “Sounds,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2005/2010). Accessed June 
3, 2014, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sounds/.
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19 A. S. Bregman, Auditory Scene Analysis: The Perceptual Organization of Sound. (Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts: MIT Press, 1990), 7.
20 C. Stumpf, Tonpsychologie. (Leipzig: Verlag Von S. Hirzel, 1883).
21 D. Gabor, “Acoustical quanta and the theory of hearing,” Nature 159 (1947): 591–594.
22 Specifi cally, it is the long-wavelength phonon (the acoustic phonon – the curious concept of the 
‘sounding sound’ or ‘sound having to do with sound’ if one were to translate this literally) that gives 
rise to sound (thus, the phonon itself is not sound).
23 Pasnau. What is Sound? 316.
24 Ibid. 316.
25 Ibid. 311.
useful in this article’s context because they begin to take on a phenomenological fl a-
vour where the focus shifts from the physical properties of, and changes in, a medium 
toward a focus upon sensation, perception, and cognition. Furthermore, those defi ni-
tions that I do describe below are reasonably current as of date of writing. One should 
not, however, make the mistake of assuming that stressing the importance of percep-
tion to any study of sound or, indeed, defi ning sound in perceptual terms is anything 
new. Bregman’s work, for example, and although one must assume that he holds to 
the standard view of sound because “sound enters the ear”,19 is important in that it is 
an earlier statement in favour of analysing the perception of sound rather than sound 
wave properties and even earlier instances of this type of thinking (although dealing 
with music rather than sound) can be found in Carl Stump’s Tonpsychologie – an early 
example of phenomenology.20
Before I begin, though, I wish to briefl y present another physics-based defi nition of 
sound that is of some interest and this is the conception of sound as comprising par-
ticles. This is an ancient idea that has recently (in its bare bones conception at least) 
been given a new lease of life. The Greek philosopher Democritus, an early proponent 
of classical atomism active during the 5th and 4th centuries BC, proposed that sound 
was a stream of atoms emitted by a thing. What is of interest here is the description of 
sound as comprising particles (the atoms) that was (re)proposed in 1947 by Gabor;21 
a concept that has found use both in the fi elds of granular synthesis and quantum 
physics (where the sound particle is termed the phonon22).
Sound as a property of an object
Pasnau, in his argument for the incoherency of the standard view of sound, suggests 
instead that sounds reside “within the object that ‘makes’ them [...] sounds are  either 
vibrations of such objects, or supervene on those vibrations”.23 While this statement 
is ambiguous (sound is either a vibration or is contingent upon a vibration), Pasnau 
is quite clear about the location of the sound – it is within the object and thus “ob-
jects have sounds”.24 This question of the location of sound, rightly so, is fundamen-
tal to the genesis of any defi nition of sound, no less for Pasnau who appeals to the 
veridicality of our auditory perception. This perception informs us that sound, like 
colour, is located at the object and is part of the external world (hence we can use the 
location of sound to locate objects in that external world): “we do not hear sounds 
as being in the air; we hear them as being at the place where they are generated”.25 
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To locate sound elsewhere is a denial of the veridicality of our perception, a deni-
al that, for Pasnau, is a step too far as it “shakes the very foundations of our cogni-
tive  assumptions”.26
Sound as an event
Basing his idea upon Aristotle’s statement that “sound is a particular movement in 
air”27 – a statement that prima facie appears to support the standard view of sound 
– O’Callaghan argues that sound is an event that sets a “medium into periodic mo-
tion”.28 He arrives at this defi nition via two other passages in De Anima: “everything 
which makes a sound does so because something strikes something else in some-
thing else again, and this last is air” and “sound is the movement of that which can 
be moved”.29 In this defi nition, sound waves, and indeed our perception of them, are 
mere by-products of sound events and these events, comprising as they do movement, 
involve change and therefore take place over time.
Sound as both object and event
Here, I come to the fi rst phenomenological defi nition of sound in which sound nei-
ther possesses physicality nor is it the property of a physical (and external) object. 
For Scruton, sound is both object and event; that is to say, sounds are secondary 
objects and pure events because they do not undergo change, as physical objects do, 
and they do not happen to anything.30 Scruton’s approach is closer to the valid, ve-
ridical defi nition of sound that I aim for because it is founded upon an assessment 
of “those features of sound that make sound so important to us [...] socially, moral-
ly, and aesthetically”.31 Furthermore, Scruton takes account of acousmatic phenom-
ena arguing that sound (e.g. in the case of radio broadcasts or audio recordings) 
suffers no loss in coherence when divorced from its physical source and no loss in 
what “is essential to the sound as an object of attention”.32 This perceptually based 
defi nition of sound is heavily infl uenced by studies in music perception including 
those phenomena that produce “a virtual causality that has nothing to do with the 
process whereby sounds are produced”;33 the streaming and grouping of musical 
notes based upon their similarity in timbre or pitch and their temporal proximity 
to each other.
26 Ibid. 316. That Pasnau uses the word ‘assumptions’ does at least, in my view, keep the door ajar for 
such a denial.
27 Quoted in C. O’Callaghan, “Sounds and Events,” in Sounds & Perception, eds. M. Nudds and 
C. O’Callaghan, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 27.
28 Ibid. 37.
29 Quoted in Ibid. 27.
30 R. Scruton, “Sounds as Secondary Objects and Pure Events,” in Sounds & Perception, eds. M. Nudds 
and C. O’Callaghan, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 50.
31 Ibid. 62.
32 Ibid. 58.
33 Ibid. 64.
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34 M. Riddoch, “On the Non-cochlearity of the Sounds Themselves” (paper presented at International 
Computer Music Conference, September 9-14, 2012, 14).
35 Ibid. 14.
36 Ibid. 13.
37 Glennie. Hearing Essay.
38 W. W. Gaver, “What in the World do we Hear? An Ecological Approach to Auditory Perception,” Eco-
logical Psychology 5:1 (1993): 1–29.
39 W. W. Gaver, “How do we Hear in the World? Explorations in Ecological Acoustics,” Ecological Psy-
chology 5:4 (1993): 285–313. 
40 Gaver. How do we hear in the World? 286-287.
41 J. J. Gibson, The Senses Considered as Perceptual Systems, (Boston: Houghton Miffl in, 1966), 86.
Non-cochlear sound
Another phenomenological defi nition of sound is presented by Riddoch who states 
that sounds “fi rst and foremost [are] worldly phenomena”.34 For Riddoch, the stand-
ard view of sound has failed in “demonstrating a causal mechanism linking our 
neuro logical processes with the supposed subjective effect – the world of our percep-
tion”35 and, furthermore, that view does not take into account the idea that sounds 
“are always in the fi rst instance meaningful sounds”.36 On this basis, he argues that 
cochlear sound (i.e. that sound involving sound waves) is in fact non-cochlear sound, 
a group in which Riddoch also includes synaesthetic sounds (see cross-modality be-
low), infrasonic sounds that are detectable by other body parts than the ear (see, for 
example, Glennie37), and auditory imagination.
Everyday listening
While he does not provide a defi nition of sound per se, in his focus on what he terms 
everyday sounds and everyday listening, Gaver also objects to the standard view of 
sound and, for this reason, his work merits inclusion here.38 39 Importantly, Gaver’s 
everyday sounds are non-musical sounds. He therefore focuses on sounds that are in-
harmonic and noisy because these, he explains, have never been the subject of acous-
tics or psychoacoustics, two fi elds that prefer to concentrate on periodic and there-
fore pitched sounds.40 While this situation has changed somewhat in the intervening 
years, Gaver’s complaint that studies conducted under the aegis of the standard view 
of sound display methodological bias still holds. This can be summed up neatly in a 
statement provided by Gibson (by whom Gaver was infl uenced): the standard view 
of sound “treats physical sound as a phenomenon sui generis, instead of as a phe-
nomenon that specifi es the course of an ecological event; sound as pure physics, in-
stead of sound as potential stimulus information”.41 Thus, for Gaver, an incomplete 
and inaccurate view of sound is formed when a) only musical tones are studied, and 
the results then used to build up a picture of sound and auditory perception and 
b) the language used to describe sound (frequency, amplitude, and so on) is inad-
equate to the task of describing our everyday experience of sound in which we typi-
cally equate sound and sound wave source – a subject is played a sound and asked by 
the white-coated psychologist to describe what has been heard; ‘I hear a plane’, the 
subject responds much to the frustration of the psychologist who requires the answer 
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to be couched in the scientifi c language and terminology seen as appropriate to the 
study of sound.42
Problems with these defi nitions
There are a number of issues that can be raised from the above defi nitions and that 
leave me unconvinced about each of them. The fi rst I wish to deal with is the location 
of sound whether that sound is an object, a property of an object, or an event. Equal-
ly, the standard view of sound displays some incoherency within it as to the location 
of sound, if not in its defi nition(s) (although the two ANSI defi nitions given above 
provide two distinct locations) then in the lax ways to which these defi nitions have 
been put. (These I have noted above.)
The location of sound is always given in relation to the organism that hears the 
sound (thus, from the point of view of location of sound, sound is always the object 
of hearing whatever its defi nition). The locations may therefore be roughly grouped 
as distal, medial, or proximal in relation to the listener. The standard view of sound 
(and the fi rst ANSI defi nition) encapsulates the view that sound location is medial; 
it is located, as a vibration, in a medium between the sound source and the listener. 
This begs a number of questions not least of which is is sound therefore static or mobile? 
Here, we run into further problems with the standard view in that sound (in such defi -
nitions) does indeed move through the medium but it surely must initially be distal 
(as it issues forth from the sound source not the medium) and ultimately proximal 
(this, presumably, is where the second ANSI defi nition takes over – sound is auditory 
sensation originating in the ear of the listener).
Our everyday experience of the location of sound is typically that it is distal. That 
is, the sound is located at the sound source, hence our everyday equation between 
sound and sound source. This experience is expressed in terms such as ‘the knocking 
is inside that wardrobe.’ But we also experience sounds as mobile (while the sound 
source is static) as in ‘the knocking is coming from that wardrobe.’ Equally, we can 
also experience sound inside the head and this need not be tinnitus or auditory hallu-
cination or the imagination of sounds as those who have experienced in-head locali-
zation of sound through headphone use will be familiar with. One should therefore 
be cautious with and somewhat mistrustful of defi nitions of sound (or at least theo-
ries about the location of sound in which location is fundamental to such defi nitions 
of sound) that appeal to everyday experience as there is an incoherence here too, no 
less than in the standard view of sound.
Thus, one should be distrusting of the sound as the property of an object defi ni-
tion provided by Pasnau because it is based on the supposed everyday location of 
sound as being at the sound source (the object). Equally, there is an incoherence in 
Pasnau’s view when the case of cinema (see further below) is used; sound is located in 
our every day listening on the screen yet there are no vibrations there of the type that 
 Pasnau claims are the sounds themselves. Regarding sound as an event, O’Callaghan is 
42 Gaver. How do we Hear in the World? 286-287.
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43 O’Callaghan. Sounds and Events. 48. This intervening space is the medium between sound source 
and listener and through which the sound waves (that are the effects of sounds) travel. What 
the space or locus is between the sound source and the medium in which the event takes place, 
O’Callaghan never states. One should also ask: precisely how near is ‘near’?
44 Ibid. 46.
45 See, for example, F. L. Wightman and D. J. Kistler, D (1997). “Monaural Sound Localization Revisited,” 
Journal of the Acoustical Society of America 101: 2 (1997): 1050–1063 for some objections to these 
studies on the basis that full monaural hearing is never achieved and that the test signals used do 
not include everyday sounds.
46 W. H. Slattery III and J. C. Middlebrooks, “Monaural Sound Localization: Acute Versus Chronic Uni-
lateral Impairment,” Hearing Research 75:1-2 (1994): 38–46. 
47 O. Kacelnik, F. R. Nodal, K. H. Parsons, and A. J. King, “Training-induced Plasticity of Auditory Lo-
calization in Adult Mammals,” PLoS Biology 4:4 (2006): 0627–0638.
48 Briefl y, organisms with binaural hearing use two overlapping channels of auditory information in 
order to localize sound; for humans, lateral sound sources can be localized using interaural level dif-
ference if frequencies in the sound wave are above about 640Hz and interaural time difference if fre-
quencies in the sound wave are below about 740Hz. Ambiguity about the direction of sound sources 
directly ahead or behind and for sound source position on the vertical plane are resolved through as-
sessing the spectral fi ltering effects of pinnae and through the simple expedient of moving our heads.
frustratingly vague in stating that “sounds are events that take place near their sources, 
not in the intervening space”43 while being explicit that “sounds are stationary relative 
to their sources”.44
On the location and locatedness of sound, the evidence from neuroscience is of 
interest as are the observed effects of cross-modality, particularly those effects arising 
from the interoperation of vision and hearing. In the fi rst instance, I specifi cally refer 
to neuroplasticity as it relates to the auditory system. In auditory neuroscience, the lo-
calization of sound refers to the ability to locate the sound wave source viz. the source 
of the sound. Thus, in this branch of science, sound is located distally – to locate the 
sound is to locate the source of the sound because the sound is located at that object 
or event. The book on which this article is based is able to go into far greater detail on 
the subject of neuroplasticity than I have the space to do so here, therefore I will limit 
myself to some brief notes on the most pertinent points to be made.
There are a number of studies (on humans, other animals, and birds) demon-
strating that the artifi cial blocking of one ear displaces (in some cases signifi cantly) 
the horizontal localization of sound when compared to localization using two un-
impaired ears (binaural hearing).45 (See, for instance, Slattery and Middlebrooks or 
Kacelnik and colleagues.46 47) This phenomenon is as expected if one subscribes to 
the Duplex Theory of sound localization.48 By itself, this raises questions as to the lo-
cation and act of locating sound – one could infer, for example, that if sounds are 
sound waves (which radiate out from a source) then sounds can be located as being 
in or from a direction that is different to where the sound wave source is if binaural 
hearing is impaired (the same effect is not noticed with vision if one eye is shut). In 
this case, and logically, sound is not located at the sound source but is mobile and 
in the medium. Nevertheless, these neurological studies prefer to state that sound is 
being incorrectly localized (because sound is distal and located at the sound source 
in this  science).
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Some of these studies and others demonstrate that such mislocalization of the 
sound source (although it remains accurate localization of the sound wave or some 
point along its front) can be corrected over time and such re-localization facilitated 
and hastened along with training.49 The brain’s processes and physical structures for 
localization change and adapt to the new monaural conditions and such neuroplas-
tic ability is maintained throughout life.50 Interestingly, some studies suggest that the 
brain can store more than one of these auditory localization schema, switching almost 
immediately among them as the subject’s monaural and binaural conditions change.51
Outside of neuroscientifi c studies, there are numerous everyday examples of the hu-
man ability to localize the sound in some direction or at some spot other than from 
where the sound wave travels or the sound wave source is. The prime example of this 
is what is known in psychoacoustics as the ventriloquism effect52 or in fi lm studies and 
related areas, with some minor differences to the ventriloquism effect, as synchrony 
or synchresis.53 54 Briefl y, synchresis is the cross-modal effect of multi-modal stimuli 
(in this case, visual and aural) being perceived as one event and it is an effect that is 
fundamental to that cinema that uses diegetic sound. It relies on the ability to sepa-
rate sound from the sound source (sound waves and the cinema’s loudspeakers) and 
to localize the sound not at the sound source but on events, objects, or characters de-
picted on the screen. This bears some relation to the McGurk Effect discussed above in 
that the sound heard depends to some extent on the image seen but the difference is 
to do with the location and localizing of sound. As with the neuroscientifi c evidence 
from sound localization studies above, synchresis is a process that relies on the ability 
to locate sounds other than where their sound wave sources are and, thus, to perceive 
that the sound travels in a direction other than the direction the sound waves them-
selves radiate from.55 This not only casts further doubt on the Duplex Theory, but also 
further reinforces my doubts about the standard view of sound and other defi nitions 
such as sound as property of an object or sound as event (located at or near its source).
49 e.g. P. M. Hofman, J. G. A. Van Riswick, and A. J. Van Opstal, “Relearning Sound Localization with 
New Ears,” Nature Neuroscience 1:5 (1998): 417–421. 
50 See, for example, M. Schnupp, I. Nelkin, and A. King, Auditory Neuroscience: Making Sense of 
Sound (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2010). 
51 e.g. Hofman et al. Relearning Sound Localization with New Ears.
52 See, for example, D. H. Warren, R. B. Welch, and T. J. McCarthy, “The Role of Visual-auditory “Com-
pellingness” in the Ventriloquism Effect: Implications for Transitivity Among the Spatial Senses,” 
Perception & Psychophysics 30:6 (1981): 557–564. 
53 J. D. Anderson, The Reality of Illusion: An Ecological Approach to Cognitive Film Theory, (Carbon-
dale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1996). 
54 M. Chion, Audio-vision: Sound on Screen, trans. C. Gorbman, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1994). 
55 It may be that this is also an instance of neuroplasticity and an example of the ability to store and 
recall instantaneously multiple auditory localization schema. The cinema, of course, is not a labora-
tory scenario where binaural hearing is artifi cially impaired but I am unaware of studies conducted 
on cinema audiences looking for evidence of auditory neuroplasticity. One schema is learned and 
used within the artifi cial environment of the cinema or when watching television or playing com-
puter games, with at least one other schema for use elsewhere where sounds ought be perceived as 
originating from the sound wave source – very important when crossing the road, for example. How-
ever, see below for an argument concerning our active locating of sound.
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One other objection I have to some of the non-standard view defi nitions relates to 
the methodology used. This is particularly the case with Scruton’s defi nition. My ob-
jection here relates to Scruton’s insistence that humans alone have the ability to per-
ceive order in sound (and thus they alone can perceive music as opposed to sound) 
and the basis of his thinking behind the defi nition being studies of music percep-
tion.56 In the fi rst case, this claim rests upon increasingly shaky ground.57 Second, in 
limiting his thinking to music studies alone, Scruton derives a defi nition that is found-
ed upon the wrong object of attention; music is neither sound alone nor is it alone 
sound. O’Callaghan displays a similar bias towards musical or pitched sounds (which 
I believe weakens his argument for a defi nition of sound) when he states that a sound 
event sets a “medium into periodic motion”58 – not all sound waves are periodic and 
thus O’Callaghan’s defi nition is not for all sounds.
The intention of this section has been to briefl y enumerate and examine a number 
of questions concerning the standard view of sound and other defi nitions of sound. 
This is because, to my thinking, there are inconsistencies in the defi nitions and inco-
herency within some of the more accepted defi nitions and this leads me to question 
their validity and therefore their effectiveness and suitability of purpose.59 The next 
section presents an alternative defi nition. As with the defi nitions and their problems 
listed above, the presentation of this new defi nition is necessarily brief. Its full exposi-
tion can be found within the book on which this article is based.
Sonic Virtuality
Sound is an emergent perception arising primarily in the auditory cortex and that is 
formed through spatio-temporal processes in an embodied system
This defi nition of sound is the one that my co-author Tom Garner and I developed 
fi rst in response to our many objections to other defi nitions that we deemed wholly 
unsatisfactory and/or incoherent and, second, as a result of several years collabora-
tion particularly in the area of biofeedback and computer-game audio. There is no 
intention to replace the standard view of sound – briefl y, that sound is a sound wave 
– although we contend that what is studied in physics and acoustics is not sound but 
sound waves; seen from that point of view, the standard view of sound (waves) is per-
fectly valid (if a  little inconsistent in its application), verifi able, and usable (usability 
is what defi nitions are about, after all). Our intention is to provide a defi nition that a) 
56 Scruton. Sounds as Secondary Objects and Pure Events. 62-66.
57 See A. D. Patel, J. R. Iversen, M. R. Bregman, and I. Shulz, “Studying Synchronization to a Musical 
Beat in Nonhuman Animals,” The Neurosciences and Music III—Disorders and Plasticity: Annals of 
the New York Academy of Sciences (2009), 459–469 for an overview of claims for music perception 
abilities among non-humans.
58 O’Callaghan. Sounds and Events. 37.
59 I am not the fi rst to point out the many inconsistencies and outright incoherency of the standard 
physics-based defi nition(s) of sound and here I only provide a few of the many objections that could 
be and are raised. Others providing fuller accounts include Pasnau (1999) and Riddoch (2012).
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answers the many questions and supports and explains the positions we have about 
sound that are not answered or evidenced by other defi nitions and b) has a use-value 
particularly in the area in which we work, work that may be described as human-cen-
tred sound design. As stated, Tom Garner and I have worked and continue to work in 
the area of computer game audio and are especially interested in the real-time recog-
nition of player affective states, feeding data on those states into the game engine, and 
using them to synthesize or process audio in response (which then re-engages with 
the players’ affective states thus creating a biofeedback loop). This can be done and we 
have done it.60 61 What is diffi cult, though, is the recognition of emotions and affect 
beyond basic valence and arousal and what is lacking is comprehensive knowledge on 
the effects that sounds (rather than  music) and changes in audio parameters in vari-
ous contexts have on the individual’s arousal state and emotions. Clearly, a model of 
sound founded upon a defi nition of sound that acknowledges the human factor, and 
particularly its subjectivity, will be of some use here. And this not only has use in my 
particular fi eld but it also has use within other fi elds such as the fi eld of recording mu-
sic and sound. Before I move onto some thoughts about such usage, though, I need to 
unpack the defi nition above and to explain its genesis.
Sound is an emergent perception . . .
This is the core of our defi nition; sound is a perception within our minds – thus, the 
origin of sound is there – and its creation is an on-going, emergent process.
. . . arising primarily in the auditory cortex . . .
This emergent perception is initiated in a corporeal system and is centred upon the audi-
tory cortex. A number of factors together contribute to the emergence of sound as these 
include both corporeally external factors (the exosonus) such as sound waves and stimuli 
across other sensory modalities, and internal factors (the endosonus) such as other per-
ceptions (thus cross-modality), emotions, memory, reasoning, knowledge, and so forth.
. . . and that is formed through spatio-temporal processes . . .
The emergence of sound takes place over time and is inherently spatial being part of 
the process of locating self in the world.
. . . in an embodied system.
Following ideas expressed in the fi eld of embodied cognition, the perception that 
is sound is a brain- and body-based function and is indivisible from the wider en-
vironment – the embodied system in which sound emerges comprises brain, body, 
and  environment.
60 M. Grimshaw and T. Garner, “Embodied virtual acoustic ecologies of computer games,” in The Ox-
ford Handbook of Interactive Audio, eds. K. E. Collins, B. Kapralos, and H. Tessler, 181–195. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2014).
61 T. A. Garner and M. Grimshaw, “The Physiology of Fear and Sound: Working with Biometrics to-
ward Automated Emotion Recognition in Adaptive Gaming Systems,” IADIS International Journal 
on WWW/Internet 11:2 (2013).
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From this defi nition, several key propositions and assertions arise that are more fully 
stated and supported in the book:
– It is the sonic aggregate that is the engine for the emergence of sound and it com-
prises fl uid and dynamic spatio-temporal relationships of sensuous/nonsensuous, 
material/immaterial things and phenomena
– The set of material, sensuous components of the sonic aggregate we term the exo-
sonus – it is not a requirement for the emergence of sound
– The set of immaterial, nonsensuous components of the sonic aggregate we term the 
endosonus – it is a requirement for the emergence of sound
– Using Deleuzian terminology62, all components of the sonic aggregate, whether 
exo sonic or endosonic, are actual as is sound. The actualization that is the emer-
gence of sound as a perception derives from processes that are themselves virtual
– It is the force of potential in the fl uid, dynamic sonic aggregate that, when achieved 
under particular spatio-temporal conditions, leads to the actualization itself
– The hear and now of sound is the emergent actualization in the here and now and it 
requires the presence of a perceiver
– In order to locate ourselves, we cognitively offl oad the location of sound onto the 
environment – this is an active (re)location of sound
– Sound is meaningful because different types of meaning form part of the endo-
sonus; sound waves are inherently meaningless
– A sound wave may be acousmatic but a sound is never acousmatic. Hence, reduced 
listening (the concept of a sound divorced from source, cause, environment, and 
meaning – and thus listenable to in and of itself) remains a theoretical concept not 
achievable in practice
– Discussions of real sound and virtual sound are invalid as there is no such distinction
– The emergence of sound can determine epistemic perspective as epistemic perspec-
tive can determine the quality and nature of the emergent sound
– Imagined sound is as much sound as that sound perceived in the presence of 
sound waves.
It should be immediately clear from the above that our description is, in large part, 
founded upon the Deleuzian concept of the virtual. Thus, the sonic aggregate has 
some equivalence to the concept of the virtual cloud. It is from this sonic aggregate, 
with its dynamic tension and shifting potentials, that sound is actualized as an emer-
gent perception. This aggregate comprises the endosonus and may optionally, as it fre-
quently does, also comprise exosonic components such as sound waves. In the asser-
tion that sound waves are not necessary to the emergence of the sound perception, the 
defi nition thus accounts for a wider and, to my mind, more valid view of what sound 
is than the standard view is capable of doing. In doing so, it tackles a number of in-
62 e.g. virtuality encompasses the idea of a dynamic virtual cloud of potentiality from which actualization 
occurs. It is important to note that, in this conception of virtuality, the virtual is a mode of the real 
and not to be contrasted to the real (pace real worlds and virtual worlds). 
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consistencies and sonic anomalies at odds with this standard view such as tinnitus 
(which is sound) and how the McGurk Effect is perceived as different sounds despite 
the presence of the same sound wave.
I have previously stated that the question of the location of sound is fundamental 
to many defi nitions of sound; if one can decide where sound is then one is halfway to 
defi ning what sound is because the location is descriptive of the sound’s environment. 
I do not think that the concept of sonic virtuality is likewise so dependent upon the 
location of sound but, nevertheless, I feel bound to use the defi nition and concept to 
explain the location of sound.
How is it that, for something so fundamental to the daily living of so many organ-
isms including humans, for something that for so long has been an object of intense 
study, and for something for which the standard view of sound offers a medium-spe-
cifi c location, there is so much disagreement about the location of sound? Perhaps 
there is something wrong with all those defi nitions. The concept of sonic virtuality 
offers this explanation: the origin of sound is in the secondary auditory cortex63 but, 
where the mind is a system comprising brain, body, and environment, sound can be 
located anywhere in this system. This is not to say that the defi nitions founded upon 
or arguing that sound is distal, medial, or proximal are all, and at one and the same 
time, correct. Far from it. Such defi nitions use the passive form of ‘to locate’ and so 
sound is to be found somewhere, typically out there in the world.
Sonic virtuality, on the other hand, uses ‘to locate’ in the active sense. We ourselves 
locate, that is, place (rather than fi nd) sounds somewhere within the system of which 
the mind is comprised. This is the cognitive off-loading that is one of the tenets of em-
bodied cognition. This locating of sound is learned and develops through early child-
hood into an automatic act of placement and it explains the close and cross-modal 
relationship to vision as we, while babies, cast around, looking for the source of a 
sound wave, beginning to learn the associations between movement, size, and mate-
rial and sound waves. It is a skill that can be lost and relearned (as neuroplasticity 
demonstrates) and it can be adjusted at will to new physical environments (such as 
the  cinema or when playing a computer game where the location of a sound wave in 
air or the location of the origin of that sound wave are very different to those places 
where we actively locate the sound). The ability to actively locate sound arises from 
the necessity of being and acting within an ecology and to listen is to be present in a 
world, whether virtual or real – sound is the means not to locate objects in an external 
world but rather to locate our selves in relation to other objects.
Clearly, and as I have stressed throughout, an article cannot go into the detail that 
a book can; Sonic Virtuality is a more substantial and substantiated treatment of the 
subject matter and, in addition to what has been cursorily covered here, also includes 
evidence and support for the concept from the virtual acoustic environments of com-
63 This is justifi ed more substantially in the book but, briefl y, the assertion arises because this is the 
common locus where activity is observed when sound is perceived either in the presence of sound 
waves or through an act of imagination, bidden or unbidden.
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64 One possibility that did not make it into the book concerns the cross-modality of sound and smell 
perceptions and its relevance to presence in virtual environments. See Grimshaw, M. and Walther-
Hansen, M., “The Sound of the Smell of My Shoes,” (in proceedings of the 10th Audio Mostly Confer-
ence, October 7-9, 2015).
65 See, for example, S. Nishimoto, A. T. Vu, T. Naselaris, Y. Benjamini, B. Yu, and J. L. Gallant, “Re-
constructing Visual Experiences from Brain Activity Evoked by Natural Movies,” Current Biology 21 
(2011): 1641-1646. I must stress here that the orthodoxy of neuroscience does not express the same 
concept of image as I do of sound. That is, in this case, vision is the perception of an image and that 
perception is not the creation or emergence of an image itself. Thus, what is being extracted is not 
the image but the perception of that image.
66 B. N. Pasley, S. V. David, N. Mesgarani, A. Flinker, S. A. Shamma, N.E. Crone, et al., “Reconstructing 
Speech from Human Auditory Cortex,” PLoS Biology 10:1 (2012).
67 J. Thompson, M. Casey, and L. Torresani, “Audio Stimulus Reconstruction using Multi- source Se-
mantic Embedding, in Neural Information Processing Systems,” (paper presented at the Neural Infor-
mation Processing Systems Workshop on Machine Learning and Interpretation in Neuroimaging, December 
9-10, 2013).
68 R. J. Zatorre, P. Belin, and V. B. Penhune, “Structure and Function of Auditory Cortex: Music and 
Speech,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 6:1 (2002): 37-46.
69 R. J. Zatorre and A. R. Halpern, “Mental Concerts: Musical Imagery and Auditory Cortex,” Neuron 47 
(2005): 9-12.
puter games, the philosophy of knowledge and belief, auditory imagery, hallucination 
and other pathologies, imagination, and creativity and is at pains to demonstrate the 
practical purpose of the defi nition. It is on this last point that I will close the article. 
The presentation upon which this article is based was delivered at a conference on 
sound and music production and so, although the book gives different examples, I 
will provide an argument for the use-value of the defi nition and concept of sonic vir-
tuality within the domain of sound design and will do this by means of a brief exam-
ple of the concept as it might be used.64
If, as our defi nition asserts, sound is a perception that arises in the brain, then the 
obvious question to ask is can we extract it? Before I look more closely at this question, 
I need to clarify the terminology, particularly the word ‘extract.’ If sound is a percep-
tion in the brain, then, once extracted from the brain, it is no longer sound. To be 
more precise, then, ‘extraction’ is used metonymically here to stand for the transposi-
tion of sound to audio data. My speculative answer to the question then is, and for 
reasons outlined below, no, not yet, but it will be possible in the near future. Thus, one 
should begin to lay the groundwork for this possibility and the necessity of this is one 
of the reasons for devising the concept of sonic virtuality.
Neural decoding, as it is known within neuroscience circles, is a developing fi eld 
used, among other purposes, for the extraction of still and moving images from the 
visual cortex.65 Neural activity is decoded and visually represented on a monitor and 
this decoding is accurate enough to be able to recognize features of the image the sub-
ject is concurrently gazing at. There is work afoot on extracting speech66 and plans 
to extract music from the brain67 but, fi rst, there are good reasons to state that music 
and speech are conceptually and perceptually distinct to sound (even if somewhat and 
sometimes related) and, second, there are different processes and different regions in 
the brain involved.68 69 Previous and current composers and performers that make 
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use of data gathered from brain activity are merely using audifi cation and sonifi cation 
techniques70 rather than the extraction of sound (or music or speech).
The defi nition of sound presented here, and especially the concept of the sonic ag-
gregate, is necessary to any thinking on how to extract sound.71 It makes sense to con-
ceive of sound as emerging from something like a sonic aggregate in the context of 
phenomena such as the McGurk Effect and when aware of the effect of higher order 
cognitive processing on auditory perception72 and the effect of cross-modal sensation 
on auditory perception.73 74 75 Sound may arise primarily in the auditory cortex but 
there are other sensory, perceptual, and cognitive factors involved too and these must 
be taken into account when attempting to extract sound.
Let us assume that, sometime in the future, it becomes possible to extract sound 
from the brain. Then what? If the extraction of sound is the transposition of sound to 
audio data then it becomes possible to conceive of, and design the possibility for, a 
process of sound design whereby the sound designer imagines and projects sound into 
a digital audio workstation. Thus, the sound conjured up in the absence of sound waves 
becomes available for manipulation as audio data, for copying, and for reproduction 
in the form of sound waves. This will fundamentally change the role of sound designer. 
Naturally, as sound in our concept is highly individual, the sounds emerging from the 
sonic aggregates of others then exposed to these sound waves are likely to have some 
differences to the original. This exemplifi es the inherent subjectivity of the emergent 
perception and the necessity for the involvement of the perceiver that becomes evident 
from any study of sound – the sound is the object of perception, the sound wave is 
the object of sensation – and this difference is what missing from the standard view of 
sound and neither is it fully accounted for by other defi nitions of sound.
70 See M. Ortiz, “A Brief History of Biosignal-Driven Art: From Biofeedback to Biophysical Perform-
ance,” econtact 14:2 (2012) for an overview. 
71 Or a defi nition and concept that are similar.
72 e.g. N. Bunzeck, T. Wuestenberg, K. Lutz, H-J. Heinze, and L. Jancke, “Scanning Silence: Mental Im-
agery of Complex Sounds,” NeuroImage 26:4 (2005): 1119–1127. 
73 M. Hoshiyama, A. Gunji, R. Kakigi, “Hearing the Sound of Silence: A Magnetoencephalographic 
Study,” NeuroReport 12:6 (2001): 1097–1102. 
74 J. Voisin, A. Bidet-Caulet, O. Bertrand, and P. Fonlupt, “Listening in Silence Activates Auditory Areas: 
A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study,” The Journal of Neuroscience 26:1 (2006): 273–
278. 
75 R. J. Zatorre, “There’s More to Auditory Cortex than Meets the Ear,” Hearing Research 229 (2007): 
24-30.
